The Paradox of Law in Wartime: When the Rules Matter Most, They Are Most Easily Broken
International humanitarian law was not designed for peacetime. It was designed for exactly this moment — when a powerful nation is at war, when emotions run high, when military logic demands maximum force, and when the temptation to abandon restraint is strongest. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols exist precisely because their drafters understood that war creates pressure to do terrible things, and that the difference between civilization and barbarism often comes down to whether rules are followed when following them is hardest.
The question of whether bombing civilian infrastructure constitutes a war crime is not academic. It is urgent, specific, and has direct bearing on decisions being made right now in Washington, D.C. regarding the US military campaign against Iran. President Trump has publicly threatened to destroy Iran’s bridges, power plants, water treatment facilities, and other civilian infrastructure — to bomb the country “back to the Stone Age.” More than 100 legal experts have warned that carrying out these threats would violate international law.
This analysis is not advocacy. It is not pro-Iranian or anti-American. It is an attempt to present, as clearly and thoroughly as possible, what international law actually says about the targeting of civilian infrastructure, what the relevant precedents are, and what the consequences of violation would be. The law does not take sides. It establishes rules that apply to everyone. Understanding those rules is essential for any serious engagement with the most consequential legal question of the Iran conflict.
The Legal Foundation: What the Law Actually Says
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
The primary legal framework governing the conduct of armed conflict is the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. These treaties, ratified by virtually every nation on earth (including the United States, which ratified the Conventions though not Additional Protocol I), establish the fundamental rules that govern how wars may be fought.
The provisions most directly relevant to the question of infrastructure targeting are found in Additional Protocol I, which codifies rules that are also recognized as customary international law binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification:
Article 48 — Basic Rule of Distinction:
“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”
This is the foundation of international humanitarian law’s approach to targeting. It establishes an absolute obligation to distinguish between civilian and military objects, and to direct attacks only against the latter. According to analysis published by Reuters, this principle is considered jus cogens — a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted.
Article 52 — General Protection of Civilian Objects:
“1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.”
“2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”
This article establishes two critical tests for any potential target: (1) Does the object make an “effective contribution to military action”? and (2) Does its destruction offer a “definite military advantage”? Both conditions must be met for an object to qualify as a legitimate military objective. A power plant that primarily serves civilian needs, or a bridge that primarily carries civilian traffic, does not automatically become a military objective merely because some military use exists.
Article 54 — Protection of Objects Indispensable to Civilian Survival:
“1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.”
“2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.”
This article is particularly significant because it extends beyond the general prohibition on attacking civilian objects to create a specific, heightened protection for infrastructure that is essential to keeping civilians alive. Water treatment plants, which depend on electrical power, fall squarely within this provision. Power plants themselves, while not explicitly named, are functionally indispensable because virtually every system that sustains civilian life — water treatment, food storage, medical care, heating, cooling — depends on electricity.
Article 51(5)(b) — The Proportionality Principle:
“Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: … (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”
This is the proportionality test. Even when a target qualifies as a legitimate military objective, the expected civilian harm must not be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage. The deliberate destruction of an entire nation’s electrical grid, water system, and transportation network would cause civilian harm on a massive scale. The military advantage of such destruction — denying these systems to enemy military forces — must be weighed against this civilian cost. Legal experts overwhelmingly conclude that systematic infrastructure destruction fails the proportionality test.
Customary International Law
Beyond treaty law, the principles described above are also recognized as customary international law — rules that bind all states regardless of which treaties they have ratified. This is particularly important for the United States, which has ratified the Geneva Conventions but not Additional Protocol I.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in its authoritative study of customary international humanitarian law, has identified the following as customary rules:
- Rule 7: The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives.
- Rule 14: Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.
- Rule 54: Attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population is prohibited.
These customary rules bind the United States regardless of its treaty obligations, and violations constitute war crimes under customary international law.
The Rome Statute: Criminal Liability
War Crimes Provisions
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which entered into force in 2002, codifies individual criminal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Although the US is not a party to the Rome Statute, the definitions it contains reflect customary international law and provide the most comprehensive codification of international criminal law currently in force.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines war crimes to include:
- “Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives” (Article 8(2)(b)(ii))
- “Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects … which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (Article 8(2)(b)(iv))
- “Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war” (Article 8(2)(b)(xiii))
The deliberate, systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure as threatened by President Trump would potentially satisfy the elements of all three of these provisions.
Crimes Against Humanity
If infrastructure destruction is carried out as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,” it could also constitute crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The elements of crimes against humanity include:
- The attack must be widespread or systematic
- It must be directed against a civilian population
- The perpetrator must know that the conduct was part of such an attack
A systematic campaign to destroy an entire nation’s civilian infrastructure — explicitly described by the president as intended to make it “impossible for them to function as a country” — would satisfy these elements. The civilian population of 88 million Iranians would be the direct and acknowledged target of the destruction.
Historical Precedents: What Courts Have Ruled
The Nuremberg Principles
The Nuremberg Tribunals following World War II established the foundational principle that individuals — including heads of state and military commanders — can be held personally responsible for war crimes. The trials addressed, among other issues, the systematic destruction of civilian property and infrastructure by occupying forces.
The Nuremberg Principles, subsequently adopted by the United Nations International Law Commission, established that:
- Crimes against international law are committed by individuals, not abstract entities
- Superior orders do not relieve an individual of responsibility for international crimes
- Heads of state are not immune from prosecution for international crimes
These principles remain the cornerstone of international criminal law and directly apply to the question of individual responsibility for ordering infrastructure destruction.
ICTY Precedents
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) produced the most directly relevant precedents for infrastructure targeting:
The Blaskic Case: Croatian commander Tihomir Blaskic was convicted partly for the destruction of civilian institutions and property. The tribunal held that the deliberate destruction of civilian objects constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.
The Galic Case: General Stanislav Galic was convicted of terror against the civilian population of Sarajevo, including attacks on civilian infrastructure. The tribunal established that systematic attacks designed to terrorize civilians through infrastructure destruction constitute war crimes.
The Strugar Case: Commander Pavle Strugar was convicted for the destruction of civilian objects in the shelling of Dubrovnik. The case established important precedents regarding the proportionality assessment for attacks that damage civilian infrastructure.
According to legal analysis cited by Al Jazeera, these ICTY cases collectively establish that the deliberate targeting and destruction of civilian infrastructure can constitute war crimes, that individual criminal responsibility attaches to those who order such destruction, and that the proportionality analysis must genuinely weigh civilian harm against military advantage rather than serving as a rubber stamp for military decisions.
The Iraq Infrastructure Precedent
The most directly analogous historical example is the US-led coalition’s targeting of Iraqi infrastructure during the 1991 Gulf War. Coalition forces systematically destroyed Iraq’s electrical grid, water treatment systems, telecommunications, and bridges. A post-war UN assessment found that the damage had reduced Iraq to “a pre-industrial age.”
The humanitarian consequences were catastrophic. A 1999 UNICEF study estimated that the combined effects of infrastructure destruction and subsequent sanctions contributed to approximately 500,000 excess deaths among Iraqi children under five between 1991 and 1998. While these figures have been debated, the fundamental reality — that infrastructure destruction caused mass civilian suffering — is not seriously disputed.
No US officials were prosecuted for the 1991 infrastructure campaign. However, the absence of prosecution does not establish legality. Legal scholars widely regard the systematic targeting of Iraqi civilian infrastructure as a violation of international humanitarian law, even though accountability was never pursued. The Iraq precedent is frequently cited as a cautionary example of the gap between what the law prohibits and what powerful states can do without facing consequences — a gap that undermines the rule of law itself.
The US Legal Position: Strengths and Weaknesses
The Administration’s Legal Arguments
The US government’s legal position on infrastructure targeting rests on several arguments that have been articulated by administration lawyers and supporters:
1. Dual-use doctrine: The argument that most infrastructure serves both military and civilian purposes, making it a legitimate military objective. Administration lawyers contend that Iran’s military is so thoroughly integrated into civilian infrastructure that virtually every major facility has a military function.
2. Military necessity: The argument that destroying infrastructure is militarily necessary to degrade Iran’s war-fighting capability, disrupt its command and control, and deny resources to its military forces.
3. Proportionality as judgment call: The argument that proportionality assessments are inherently subjective and that the military commanders conducting them are in the best position to weigh military advantage against civilian risk.
4. Non-applicability of Additional Protocol I: The argument that the US has not ratified Additional Protocol I and is therefore not bound by its specific provisions, though the US acknowledges that many of its rules reflect customary international law.
5. Sovereign immunity and non-recognition of ICC: The practical argument that the US does not recognize ICC jurisdiction and that US officials cannot realistically be brought before international courts.
The Weaknesses in These Arguments
Each of these arguments has significant legal weaknesses:
Dual-use has limits: While the dual-use doctrine is well-established in IHL, it does not provide blanket authorization to destroy all infrastructure that has any military connection. The test under Article 52 requires that each specific target make an “effective contribution to military action” and that its destruction provide a “definite military advantage.” The systematic destruction of an entire nation’s civilian infrastructure cannot be justified on a target-by-target dual-use analysis — at some point, the campaign crosses from targeting specific military-connected facilities to systematically destroying the systems that sustain civilian life.
Military necessity is not unlimited: The principle of military necessity authorizes measures that are “necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law.” The critical qualifier is “not otherwise prohibited” — military necessity cannot override the prohibition on targeting civilian objects or the proportionality principle. No military advantage justifies the deliberate creation of a humanitarian catastrophe affecting tens of millions of civilians.
Proportionality is not purely subjective: While proportionality assessments involve judgment, they are not entirely discretionary. The law requires that the assessment be conducted in good faith and that the conclusion be one that a reasonable military commander could reach. An openly stated intention to make it “impossible for [Iran] to function as a country” — language that explicitly targets civilian functionality — demonstrates that the proportionality analysis is not being conducted in good faith but is being used to justify a predetermined decision to destroy civilian systems.
Customary law binds regardless of treaty status: The US’s non-ratification of Additional Protocol I does not exempt it from the customary international law rules that the Protocol codifies. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and protection of objects indispensable to civilian survival are all recognized as customary law, binding on all states.
Immunity from prosecution is not immunity from law: The fact that the US may be practically immune from ICC prosecution does not make the prohibited conduct lawful. It merely means that accountability may be delayed, deferred, or pursued through alternative mechanisms. Legal exposure persists indefinitely, and the political and diplomatic consequences of documented violations can be severe even without formal prosecution.
The Expert Consensus: What 100+ Legal Scholars Say
The open letter signed by more than 100 international law experts represents an extraordinary consensus from the legal academic and practitioner community. The signatories include:
- Former judges of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court
- Current and former professors of international law at the world’s leading universities (Harvard, Yale, Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne, Leiden, and others)
- Former UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights, international law, and the laws of armed conflict
- Retired military lawyers (Judge Advocate General officers) from the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and other NATO nations
- Former legal advisors to international organizations including the ICRC, the UN, and regional human rights bodies
The letter’s conclusions are unambiguous:
- The deliberate, systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure violates the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law.
- Such destruction constitutes war crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
- If conducted systematically against a civilian population, it may constitute crimes against humanity under Article 7.
- Individual criminal responsibility attaches to those who order, plan, or execute such attacks.
- The dual-use doctrine does not provide legal cover for the systematic destruction of infrastructure primarily serving civilian purposes.
- Historical non-prosecution of similar conduct does not establish legality or create binding precedent.
As noted by The Wall Street Journal, the breadth and depth of this expert consensus is remarkable. While individual legal experts can and do disagree on many questions of international humanitarian law, the virtually unanimous conclusion that systematic infrastructure destruction constitutes a war crime reflects a level of legal clarity that is unusual in this field.
The Practical Consequences of Violation
Legal Consequences
If the US proceeds with systematic destruction of Iranian civilian infrastructure, the legal consequences would include:
- ICC investigation: The ICC Prosecutor would almost certainly open a formal investigation. While the US does not recognize ICC jurisdiction, the investigation would produce a public record of findings, witness testimony, and potentially arrest warrants that would affect the travel, diplomatic standing, and future legal exposure of named individuals.
- Universal jurisdiction proceedings: Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, courts in other countries can prosecute war crimes regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrator. Several countries — including Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Argentina — have active universal jurisdiction frameworks. Individual US officials named in ICC proceedings or independent investigations could face arrest warrants enforceable in countries that recognize universal jurisdiction.
- Civil liability: Victims of unlawful attacks may pursue civil remedies in courts of various jurisdictions. While sovereign immunity protections limit the ability to sue foreign states, individual liability can attach to officials who ordered unlawful conduct.
Political and Diplomatic Consequences
Beyond formal legal proceedings, the political and diplomatic consequences of documented infrastructure war crimes would be substantial:
- Alliance fracture: Key US allies, particularly in Europe, have signaled that systematic infrastructure targeting would compel them to publicly distance from the campaign and potentially withdraw intelligence and logistical support. The transatlantic alliance, already under strain, could suffer lasting damage.
- International standing: The US’s ability to invoke international law in its own interest — in disputes over trade, territorial claims, nuclear proliferation, human rights — would be fundamentally undermined by documented violations of the same law. The precedent that infrastructure destruction is acceptable would be available to every future adversary.
- Post-conflict reconstruction: If the conflict ends and the US seeks a stable regional outcome, the destroyed infrastructure would need to be rebuilt — potentially at US expense, as occurred in Iraq. The cost of reconstruction could dwarf the cost of the military campaign itself.
- Domestic legal exposure: While the US does not recognize ICC jurisdiction, domestic legal challenges under the War Powers Act, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and other statutory frameworks could be pursued by Congress, military personnel, or advocacy groups.
The View From the Region: Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon
For the Middle East, the legal question of infrastructure targeting carries implications that extend far beyond the Iran conflict:
Egypt views the precedent with concern. As a country that has experienced conflict and that depends on critical infrastructure — notably the Aswan High Dam and the Suez Canal — for its national survival, Egypt has a direct interest in maintaining the legal prohibition on infrastructure targeting. Egyptian legal scholars have joined the international consensus condemning Trump’s threats, and Cairo has quietly communicated to Washington its view that infrastructure targeting would cross a line that has consequences for regional stability and the international legal order.
Palestine sees a direct parallel. Palestinian communities have experienced the destruction of civilian infrastructure — water systems, electrical networks, roads, schools, hospitals — in Gaza and the West Bank over decades. Palestinian legal advocates have drawn explicit connections between Trump’s threats against Iran and the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, arguing that both reflect a pattern of powerful states treating civilian infrastructure as a legitimate target in violation of international law. For Palestine, the question is not theoretical — it is lived experience.
Lebanon, which suffered extensive infrastructure destruction during the 2006 Israeli military campaign (including the deliberate targeting of bridges, power stations, and the Beirut airport), understands viscerally what infrastructure warfare means for a civilian population. The 2006 campaign’s infrastructure damage set Lebanon’s development back by years and created humanitarian suffering that persisted long after the fighting ended. Lebanese voices in the legal debate carry the authority of direct experience.
The Moral and Philosophical Dimension
Why Rules in War Matter
The laws of armed conflict are sometimes dismissed as naive idealism — rules that powerful nations ignore when it suits them. This critique contains a grain of truth but misses the fundamental point. The laws exist not because they are always followed, but because they establish a standard against which conduct is measured and around which consensus forms.
When the Geneva Conventions were drafted in the aftermath of World War II, their architects understood that wars would continue to occur and that restraint would be imperfect. What they sought to establish was a framework that would limit the worst excesses of warfare, protect those who are not fighting, and preserve a foundation of civilization even in the midst of conflict.
The prohibition on targeting civilian infrastructure is not a technicality. It reflects a fundamental moral principle: that the purpose of war is to defeat an enemy’s military forces, not to destroy the systems that keep civilians alive. Violating this principle does not just break a rule — it crosses a line between war and something worse.
The Precedent Problem
Perhaps the most consequential long-term implication of infrastructure targeting is the precedent it creates. International law develops through state practice and precedent. If the world’s most powerful military openly and systematically destroys civilian infrastructure while claiming legal justification, that practice becomes available to every other state in every future conflict.
China, Russia, India, and every other military power in the world are watching how the US conducts the Iran campaign. If infrastructure targeting is normalized, the implications for future conflicts — in Eastern Europe, in the South China Sea, in South Asia, in Africa — are profound and dangerous. The rules that protect civilians from the worst consequences of warfare depend on the most powerful states adhering to them even when it is difficult. When those states abandon the rules, the entire framework weakens.
What the Law Demands: A Clear-Eyed Assessment
Based on a thorough review of the relevant legal authorities — treaty law, customary international law, judicial precedent, and expert consensus — the legal position is clear:
- Civilian infrastructure is protected from direct attack under both treaty law and customary international law. This protection applies to all parties in the conflict, including the United States.
- Dual-use infrastructure may be targeted under specific conditions: it must make an effective contribution to military action, and its destruction must offer a definite military advantage. Even when these conditions are met, the proportionality principle requires that expected civilian harm not be excessive relative to the military advantage.
- Systematic destruction of an entire nation’s infrastructure — as threatened by President Trump — cannot be justified under any reasonable interpretation of international humanitarian law. The scale, the intent (explicitly targeting civilian functionality), and the foreseeable humanitarian consequences all point to illegality.
- Individual criminal responsibility attaches to those who order, plan, or execute attacks that violate these rules. This includes heads of state, military commanders, and civilian officials in the chain of command.
- The absence of enforcement mechanisms does not make prohibited conduct lawful. It merely means that accountability may be delayed or pursued through alternative channels.
This is not an opinion. It is the consensus of the legal profession, grounded in treaties, custom, and precedent. The law is clear. The question is whether it will be respected.
Conclusion: The Law Exists for This Moment
The Geneva Conventions were not written for peacetime. They were written for this exact situation — when a nation at war faces the temptation to unleash its full destructive power against the infrastructure that sustains its enemy’s civilian population. The lawyers who drafted these rules in the aftermath of World War II had seen what happens when that temptation goes unchecked: the devastation of European and Asian cities, the millions of civilian dead, the destruction of the fabric of civilization itself.
They wrote rules that said: even in war, there are things you may not do. You may not deliberately starve civilians. You may not destroy the systems that keep them alive. You may not make it impossible for a nation to function. These rules are not naive. They are the accumulated wisdom of humanity’s experience with the horrors of unrestricted warfare.
President Trump’s threat to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Age” directly challenges these rules. If the threat is carried out, it will constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. The legal authorities are clear. The expert consensus is overwhelming. The historical precedents are unambiguous.
The law exists for this moment. Whether it survives this moment depends on whether those with the power to violate it choose instead to respect it — and whether the international community has the will to hold them accountable if they do not.
This is not about Iran or America. It is about whether the rules that protect all civilians, in all conflicts, everywhere, will endure. The answer to that question will shape not just the outcome of this war, but the world that comes after it.
